![]() The package didn’t come from a known RPM repository at this point, though. This can be used to cryptographically verify that the package was indeed created by TeamViewer. ![]() TeamViewer signs all RPM packages with its GPG key. ![]() The user would assume it’s safe to install something that comes from the official website. To install TeamViewer, users would download this package over a secure connection. TeamViewer distributes an RPM package on its website. The vulnerability would even prompt the user to accept a new key if the system had previously trusted a different key for the TeamViewer RPM repository. The mistake let an AITM substitute its own public key during repository updates, package installations, and package updates. Unfortunately, TeamViewer made a mistake with how it distributes its GPG public key. However, it assumes that the system has a copy of TeamViewer’s public GPG key. These measures should have prevented anyone from tampering with either the repository or any of its packages. The vulnerability allowed an attacker-in-the-middle ( AITM) to subvert the TeamViewer RPM package repository to install and execute arbitrary software with root permissions.įirst thing first: TeamViewer followed best practices and used cryptographic signing (GPG) on the repository metadata and its software packages. Three months ago, I discovered a security vulnerability in TeamViewer RPM auto-updates on Linux.
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